With end-to-end encryption, the keys that unlock a message exist only on the devices at either end of the conversation. The server in the middle carries a scrambled message it cannot read. That is the whole idea: the company running the service does not have to be trusted, because it could not read your messages even if it wanted to, was hacked, or was ordered to by a court.
It is the strongest privacy protection a messenger can offer, and it is why Signal and WhatsApp are described the way they are. Signal is end-to-end encrypted for everything by default, and collects very little else. WhatsApp encrypts message content end to end but still learns a good deal of metadata: who talks to whom, when, and how often. Telegram only encrypts "secret chats" end to end; ordinary chats and groups are not.
The trade-off is that anything the server would have to read the message to do becomes impossible, or has to move onto the device. That includes screening a message for abuse before it arrives, scanning an attachment for malware, searching your history from a new device, and translating or summarising a conversation on the server. Services that claim both usually do the work on your phone, or do not do it.
End-to-end encryption also does not protect what happens at the ends. If somebody has your unlocked phone, or you screenshot a chat, or the other person forwards it, the encryption is irrelevant.
Where Naven stands
Naven is not end-to-end encrypted, and says so plainly. It screens every message against published categories before it is sent, which a server that cannot read the message would be unable to do. If end-to-end encryption is your first requirement, Signal is the honest recommendation.